In this paper, we model the various wireless users in a cognitive radio network as a collection of selfish, autonomous agents that strategically interact in order to acquire the dynamically available spectrum opportunities. Our main focus is on developing solutions for wireless users to successfully compete with each other for the limited and time-varying spectrum opportunities, given the experienced dynamics in the wireless network. We categorize these dynamics into two types: one is the disturbance due to the environment (e.g. wireless channel conditions, source traffic characteristics, etc.) and the other is the impact caused by competing users. To analyze the interactions among users given the environment disturbance, we propose a general stochastic framework for modeling how the competition among users for spectrum opportunities evolves over time. At each stage of the dynamic resource allocation, a central spectrum moderator auctions the available resources and the users strategically bid for the required resources. The joint bid actions affect the resource allocation and hence, the rewards and future strategies of all users.
I. INTRODUCTION
One vision for emerging cognitive radio networks assumes that certain portions of the spectrum will be opened up for secondary users 2 (SUs), which can autonomously and opportunistically share the spectrum once primary users (PUs) are not active [1] [2] [3] . Prior work has mainly focused on addressing two main challenges. The first problem is the detection of spectrum opportunities ("holes") that can be used by SUs for transmission [4] [5] [6] . The second challenge is developing resource allocation solutions for the efficient usage of the detected spectrum holes among autonomous wireless users [7] [8] . In this paper, our main focus will be on addressing a third challenge. We focus on developing solutions that can be employed by the SUs to improve their performance in the cognitive radio network. Specifically, we aim at investigating how delay-sensitive applications (e.g. multimedia applications) can efficiently forecast their future utility impact, and then determine their resource requirements and associated transmission strategies over time,
based on information about the available spectrum opportunities, their source and channel characteristics, and interactions with the other competing users. We concentrate in this paper on delay-sensitive data transmission applications such as real-time multimedia streaming, videoconferencing, virtual reality games etc., because they can most benefit from the additional bandwidth resources provided by emerging cognitive radio networks. Hence, if relaxed FCC regulations are to be extended to large portions of the spectrum, improved support for delay-sensitive, high-bandwidth applications should be provided.
Solving all these aforementioned challenges is important for the proliferation of both cognitive radio networks and applications that use these new networks. To address the first challenge, we rely in this paper on existing methods for identifying the spectrum holes. Concerning solutions for spectrum management, several centralized and distributed solutions already exist [11] [19] [36] [37] , including our prior research in [10] [28] . While our main interest in this paper is not on developing new solutions for addressing this spectrum management challenge, we present a general framework for the dynamic interaction in the wireless resource management, since this will enable us to investigate the multi-user interaction among delay-sensitive, time-varying multimedia applications in the cognitive radio network in a universal setting.
Our main concern in developing a successful spectrum management solution for emerging cognitive radio networks is not only to maximize the network utilization, but also to take into account the "self-interested"
behavior of individual users/applications that may try to selfishly influence the resource management. In existing wireless LAN standards such as 802.11e HCF [18] ). We refer to this coordinator as the central spectrum moderator (CSM). The role of the CSM is to allocate resources to the SUs based on pre-determined utility maximization rule 4 .
In this paper, to explicitly consider the strategic behavior of the autonomous SUs and the informationally-decentralized nature of the competition for wireless resources, we assume that the CSM deploys an auction mechanism for dynamically allocating resources. Auction theory has been extensively studied in economics [25] and it has also been recently applied to network resource allocation [9] [10][11] [26] . Note that the role of the CSM 5 in our resource management game for cognitive radio networks will be kept minimal. Unlike alternative existing solutions [28] , the CSM will not require knowledge of the private information of the users and will not perform complex computations for deciding the resource allocation. Its only role will be the implementation of the spectrum etiquette rules as in [13] , and ensuring that the available spectrum holes are auctioned among users. In order to capture the network dynamics, we allow the CSM to repeatedly auction the available spectrum opportunities based on the PUs' behaviors. Meanwhile, each SUs is allowed to strategically adapt its bidding strategy based on information about the available spectrum opportunities, its source and channel characteristics, and impacts of the other SUs bidding actions.
Using this general stochastic wireless allocation framework, the key focus of this paper is to develop a learning methodology for SUs to improve their policies for playing the auction game, i.e. the policies for generating the bids for the available resources. Specifically, during the repeated multi-user interaction, the SUs can observe partial historic information of the outcome of the auction game, through which the SUs can estimate the impact on their future rewards and then adopt their best response in order to effectively compete for the channel opportunities. The estimation of the impact on the expected future reward can be performed using different types of interactive learning [24] . In this paper, we focus on reinforcement learning [23] [38] because this allows the SUs to improve their bidding strategy based only on the knowledge of their own past received payoffs, without knowing the bids or payoffs of the other SUs. Our proposed best response learning algorithm is inspired from the Q-learning for the single agent interacting 4 Other fairness rules can also be deployed in the CSM such as air-time fairness, utility-based fairness, etc. [17] 5 It should be noted that this approach can also allow for multiple CSMs to manage the spectrum, by dividing their responsibilities fairly, e.g.
based on their geo-location [34] or frequency band in which they are operating, or by competing against each other for the number of SUs that will associated with them.
with environment. Unlike the Q-learning, the proposed best response learning explicitly considers the interactions and coupling among SUs in this multi-user cognitive radio network. By deploying the best response learning algorithm, the SUs can strategically predict the impact of current actions on future performance and then optimally make their bids.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe a system model for cognitive radio network and a general model for the resource competition among the SUs. In Section III, we propose a stochastic framework to model the multi-user interactions in the cognitive radio network. In Section IV, we propose a best response learning approach for the SUs to predict their future rewards based on the observed historic information. In Section V, we present the simulation results, followed by the conclusions in Section VI.
II. DYNAMIC MULTI-USER WIRELESS INTERACTION FRAMEWORK
We consider a spectrum consisting of N channels, each indexed by
The N wireless channels are originally licensed to a primary network (PN) whose users (i.e. PUs) exclusively access the channels. The communications of the PUs are assumed to follow the synchronous slot structure. The time slot has length T Δ in seconds. At each time slot, each channel is assumed to be in one of the following two states: ON (this channel is currently used by the PUs) or OFF (this channel is not used by the PUs and hence is an opportunity for the SUs to use). Within each time slot, the channel is only OFF or ON [14] . At time slot t ∈ , the availability of each channel j is denoted by . This can be characterized using a Spectrum Opportunity Map [14] . Note that our proposed framework is not restricted to a cognitive radio network which has licensed users, i.e. PUs. Our solution can also be applied to cognitive radio networks using multiple ISM bands.
We consider the situation in which
autonomous SUs transmitting delay-sensitive bitstreams compete for the spectrum opportunities in these N channels. Each SU is indexed by {1,..., } i M ∈ . Our goal is to develop a general mechanism for coordinating the competition for spectrum opportunities among SUs and, more importantly, to understand the competitive interactions among SUs across time, thereby enabling SUs to improve their strategies for playing the repeated resource management game based on their past interactions with other SUs.
As in [18] , we assume that a polling-based medium access protocol is deployed in the secondary network, which is arbitrated by a CSM. The polling policy is changed only at the beginning of every time slot. For simplicity, we assume that each SU can access a single channel and that each channel can be accessed by a single SU within the time slot. The SUs can switch the channels only when crossing time slots. Note that this simple medium access model used for illustration in this paper can be easily extended to more sophisticated cognitive radio models [15] , where each SU can simultaneously access multiple channels or the channels are being shared by multiple SUs etc.
We assume that the CSM is aware of the channel availability profile t y and allocates (through polling the SUs) those channels with 1 t j y = to the SUs. To efficiently allocate the available resources (opportunities), the CSM needs to collect information about the SUs [28] . However, as mentioned in Section I, in a wireless network, the information is decentralized, and thus, the information exchange between the SUs and CSM needs to be kept limited due to the incurred communication cost. On the other hand, the SUs competing with each other are selfish and strategic, and hence, the information they hold is private and may not be shared with each other. Therefore, one of our key interests in this paper is to determine what information should be exchanged between SUs and CSM and how this information should be exchanged. In the subsequent sections, we present an auction mechanism for dynamically coordinating the interactions among SUs and subsequently discuss the bidding strategy for the SUs.
A. Resource Auction Mechanism
We model the multi-user wireless resource allocation as an auction for spectrum opportunities held by the CSM during each time slot. First, the CSM announces the auction by broadcasting the channel opportunity profile t y . The SUs receive the announcement and calculate the bid vector
based on the announced information and their own private information about the environment they experience, which is discussed in details in Section III. Subsequently, each SU submits the bid vector to the CSM. After receiving the bid vectors from the SUs, the CSM computes the channel
for each SU i based on the submitted bids. To compel the SUs to declare their bids truthfully [32] , the CSM also computes the payment
that the SUs have to pay for the use of resources during the current stage of the game. The negative value of the payment means the absolute value that SU i has to pay the CSM for the used resources. The auction result is then transmitted back to the SUs which can deploy their transmission strategies in different layers and send data over the assigned channel. After the data transmission, another auction starts at the next time slot After each SU submits the bid vector, the CSM performs two computations: (i) channel allocation and (ii) payment computation. Note that most existing multi-user wireless resource allocation solutions can be modeled as such repeated auctions for resources. If the resources are priced or the users may lie about their resource needs, taxes associated with the resource usage will need to be imposed [20] . Otherwise, these taxes can be considered to be zero throughout the paper. 
The channel allocation matrix without the presence of SU i is denoted ( 1 ) [ ]
and the corresponding feasible set is
During the first phase, the CSM allocates the channels to SUs based on its adopted fairness rule, e.g. maximizing the total "social welfare" 6 :
If the resources are priced, we will consider in this paper, for illustration, a second price auction mechanism [25] [32] for determining the tax that needs to be paid by SU i based on the above optimal channel assignment , , [ ]
This tax equals:
Although the optimization problems in Eqs. (1) and (2) are discrete optimizations, they can be efficiently 6 Note that other fairness solutions than maximizing the social welfare could be adopted and this will not influence our proposed solution.
solved using linear programming or heuristic algorithms [27] . Note that when 1 N = , the generalized auction mechanism presented above becomes the well-known second price auction [25] .
B. Bidding Policy for SUs
As discussed in the introduction section, the SUs experience a dynamic environment due to the time-varying source characteristics and channel conditions as well as the channel opportunities. The variations in the environment result in different transmission strategies (e.g. cross-layer optimization [17] ), as well as different bid vectors for the available channels. The environment experienced by an SU can be characterized by its current "state" which will be discussed in Section III. The bidding policy of each SU generates the bid vector based on its current "state". After receiving the allocated channels, the SUs adapt their strategy for transmitting the packets and transition to new states in order to play the auction game in the next time slot. The conceptual overview of the multi-SUs interactions in the repeated auctions is illustrated in Figure 2 . To overcome the above addressed problems, we present in the next section a stochastic framework for modeling the dynamic interaction among users.
III. STOCHASTIC MODEL FOR SUS INTERACTION
The SUs bid for the available channels in the repeated auctions given their dynamically changing environment which they experience. 
A. Definition of SU States
As discussed in the introduction, each SU needs to cope with two types of "uncertainties" in terms of available resources: disturbances from the environment and interactions with other SUs. The environment is characterized by the packet arrivals from the source (i.e. source/traffic characterization) connected with the transmitter, the spectrum opportunities released by PUs and the channel condition. Next, we will illustrate 7 Note that the action set may depend on the state the SU is in. For simplicity, we assume the actions set are the same for all the states the SU lies in.
how these disturbances can be modeled. However, note that other models of the environment existing in the literature can be adopted. The use of a specific model will only affect the performance of the proposed solution, and not the general framework for multi-user interaction proposed in this work.
For illustration, we assume that each SU i maintains a buffer with limited size i B , which can be interpreted as a time window that specifies which packets are considered for transmission at each time based on their delay deadlines. Expired packets are dropped from the buffer. This model has been extensively used for delay-sensitive data transmission, e.g. leaky bucket model for video transmission [35] . The number of packets in the buffer at time slot t is denoted as To model the dynamics experienced by SU i at time t in the cognitive radio network, we define a "state"
, which encapsulates the current buffer state as well as the state of each channel. i S is the set of possible states 8 . The total number of possible states for SU i equals
We will show later in this paper that the state information is sufficient for SU i to compete for resources (make bid vector) at the current time.
B. Environment Modeling and State Transition
In this section, to simplify the description, we use simple models to capture the uncertainties in the 8 We assume that the channel state and the transmission buffer independently evolve as time goes by. environment of the cognitive radio network. Note though that our proposed stochastic game framework can also be extended to more sophisticated models for the cognitive radio network. Based on the environment model, we further derive the state transition for the stochastic multi-user interaction.
(
1) Model for Channel State Evolution
The opportunity of each channel j , 
⎦ being the transition probability from the state
being the transition probability from the state . By assuming that the channel evolves independently, the probability of the channel state profile transition is expressed as:
(2) Model for packet arrival
In this subsection, we discuss the modeling of the packet arrival, which is related to the buffer state
We assume that the data packets of SU i randomly arrive and the arrival times are modeled as a Poisson process with the average arrival rate i μ packets/second [16] . However, note that the Poisson process is simply used for illustration purposes and other traffic models (e.g. renewal process, etc.) can also be used in our framework. The number of packets arriving during one time slot is a random variable independent of the time t and denoted as
A is easily computed as
, which is independent of t . The average number of packets arriving during one time slot equals i T μ Δ [16] .
(3) State transition
We will now discuss the state transition process. z to the index of the specific channel that is allocated to SU i and ( ) 0
R c is the transmission rate (packets/second) which can be computed as in [31] given the channel SNR t ij c and (
Based on the packet arrival model, the buffer state transition probability is computed as
Finally, the state evolution of SU i can be expressed as
The first row in the equation above represents the evolution of the buffer state and the second row represents the channel state evolution. From this expression, we clearly note that the state evolution of the SU depends on both the environment disturbance (i.e. 
where the first term represents the buffer state transition, which is independent of the second term of the channel state transition.
C. Stage Reward
By playing the auction game in the current stage, SU i receives the channel allocation 
The gain t i g is the negative value of the number of packets lost. The stage reward is given by:
D. Selection of Bidding Policy
In the cognitive radio network, we assume that the stochastic game is played by all SUs for an infinite number of stages. This assumption is reasonable for applications having a long duration, such as video streaming. In our network setting, we define a history of the stochastic game up to time t as , where the superscript t denotes the time. This reward
of the stage k is discounted by factor ( )
is the discounted factor determined by a specific application (for instance, for video streaming applications, this factor can be set based on the tolerable delay). The total discounted sum of rewards ( ,( , )) 
where
. We assume that the SUs implement the policy t π in the subsequent time slots. The total discounted sum of rewards in Eq. (10) consists of two parts: (i) the current stage reward and (ii) the expected future reward discounted by i α . Note that SU i cannot independently determine the above value without explicitly knowing the policies and states of other SUs.
The SU maximizes the total discounted sum of future rewards in order to select the bidding policy, which explicitly considers the impact of the current bid vector on the expected future rewards.
We define the best response i β for SU i to other SUs' policies The central issue in our stochastic game is how the best response policies can be determined by the SUs.
In the repeated auction mechanism discussed in Section II.A , the procedure each SU i follows to compete for the channel opportunities is illustrated in Figure 3 . In this procedure, the bidding strategy t i π is continuously improved by the "bidding strategy improvement" module. In Section III.E, we discuss the challenges involved in building such a module, and in Section IV we develop a best response learning algorithm that can be used for improving the bidding strategy.
E. Challenges for Selecting the Bidding Policy
Recall that during each time slot, the CSM announces an auction based on the available spectrum opportunities and then SUs bid for the resources. To enable the successful deployment of this resource auction mechanism, we can prove, similarly to our prior work in [28] , that SUs have no incentive to misrepresent their information, i.e. they adhere to the "truth telling" policy. We assume that at each time slot t , SU i has preference t ij u over the channel j , which capture the benefit derived when using that channel.
The preference t ij
u is interpreted as the benefit obtained by SU i when using channel j , compared to the benefit when this channel is not used. Note that this benefit also includes the expected future rewards. , i.e. the optimal bid for SU i is to announces its true preference to the CSM [28] . The proof is omitted here due to space limitations, since it is similar to that in [28] . The payment made by SU i is computed by the CSM based on the inconvenience incurred by other SUs due to SU i during that time slot [32] . 
The preference over the current state can be then computed as can compute both the optimal bid vector as well as the optimal bidding policy. We refer to this optimal bidding policy as the "myopic" policy, since it only takes the immediate reward into consideration and ignores the future impact. The myopic policy is referred to as 
IV. INTERACTIVE LEARNING FOR PLAYING THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT GAME

A. How to Evaluate Learning Algorithms?
In Section III.E, it was shown that an SU needs to know other SUs' states and state transition models in order to derive its own optimal bidding policy. This coupling among SUs is due to the shared nature of the wireless resources. However, an SU cannot exactly know the other SUs' models and private information in the wireless networks. Thus, to improve the bidding policy, an SU can only predict the impacts of dynamics (uncertainties) caused by the competing SUs based on its observations from past auctions. In this paper, we propose a learning algorithm for predicting these uncertainties. We define a learning algorithm i L for SU i as a function taking the observation Before developing a learning algorithm, we first discuss how to evaluate the performance of a learning algorithm in terms of its impact on the SU's reward. Unlike existing multi-agent learning research, which is aimed at achieving converge to an equilibrium point for the interacting agents, we develop learning algorithms based on the performance of the bidding strategy on the SU's reward. We denote a bidding policy generated by the learning algorithm i L as
L . An SU will learn in order to improve its bidding policy and its rewards from participating in the auction game. The performance of the bidding strategy i π is defined as the time average reward that SU i obtains in a time window with length T when it adopts i π :
Using this definition, the performance of two learning algorithms can be easily compared. For instance, given two algorithm i ′ L and i ′′ L , if
B. What Information to Learn from?
First let us consider what information the SU can observe while playing the stochastic game in our cognitive radio network. As shown in Figure 3 , at the beginning of time slot t , the SUs submit the bids . Note that the classification on the state space i − S and approximation of the transition probability and discounted sum of rewards affects the learning performance. Hence, a user can tradeoff an increased complexity for an increased performance. After the classification, the preference computation can be approximated as 
In this setting, to find the approximated preference and thus, the approximated optimal bidding policy, we need to learn the following from the past observations: (i) how the space i − S is classified; (ii) the transition probability 
D. How to Learn?
In this section, we develop a learning algorithm to estimate the terms listed in Section IV.C.
(1) Decomposition of the space i −
S
As discussed in Section IV.B, only We assume the maximum absolute tax is Γ . We split the range | , 
Similar to the Q-learning established in [23] , we also use the received rewards to update the estimation of future rewards. However, the main difference between our proposed algorithm and Q-learning is that our solution explicitly considers the impacts of other SUs' bidding actions through the state classifications and transition probability approximation.
We use a 2-dimensional table to store the value ( ) , 
,
is a learning rate factor satisfying summary, the learning procedure that is developed for an SU is shown in Table 1 . 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we aim at quantifying the performance of our proposed stochastic interaction and learning framework. We assume that the SUs compete for the available spectrum opportunities in order to transmit delay-sensitive multimedia data. First, we compare the performance of various bidding strategies. Next, we quantify the performance of our proposed learning algorithm in various network environments. We will present here only several illustrative examples. However, the same observations can be obtained using a larger number of SUs or channels.
A. Various bidding strategies for dynamic multi-user interaction
In this section, we highlight the merits of the stochastic interaction framework proposed in Section III by comparing the performance of different SUs, which deploy different bidding strategies. In the repeated auction games presented in Section II, the SUs are required to submit the bid vector on the available channels. The SUs can deploy different bidding strategies to generate their bid vector:
1. Fixed bidding strategy In this simulation, we consider the cognitive radio network as an extension of WLANs with spectral agile capability [14] . In the following, we first simulate the case that two SUs compete for the channel opportunities and then extend to the case with multiple (five) SUs.
(1) Competition among two SUs for channel opportunities
We first consider a simple illustrative network with two SUs competing for the available channel opportunities. The packet arrivals of the SUs are modeled using a Poisson process with the same average arrival rate of 2Mbps. For illustration simplicity, the channel condition of SU 1 (SU 2) on each channel takes only three values ( Hence, the lower the average cost, the better the performance of the bidding strategy is. The packet loss rate, average tax and cost per time slot are presented in Table 2 . The accumulated packet loss and cost of SU 1 for the five scenarios are plotted in Figure 5 (a) and (b), respectively.
From this simulation, comparing scenario 2 with scenario 1, we observe that when SU 2 deploys the myopic strategy against SU 1 which adopted the fixed bidding strategy, SU 2 reduces its average cost by around 42% and the average packet loss rate by around 16.6%. This significant improvement is because SU 2 can value the channel opportunities more accurately by modeling and considering its experienced dynamics, i.e. source characteristics, channel conditions and availability.
In scenario 3, SU 1 improves its bidding strategy (i.e. it deploys now a source-aware bidding strategy) by partially considering its experienced environment, i.e. SU 1 generates its bid vector by only considering the source dynamics though its current buffer state. Compared to scenario 2, if SU 1 considers more information about its own state, it can further reduce its packet loss rate by an average of 4.5% and an average cost by around 5.4%. This observation verifies that the information about the SU's state improves the bidding strategy.
In scenario 4, SU 1 deploys a myopic bidding strategy which is more advanced than the source-aware bidding strategy since it considers both types of dynamics defined in Section I (including the dynamics regarding to the source characteristics, channel conditions, and channel availability, and the interaction with other SUs in the auction mechanism). The significant improvement in terms of packet loss rate (13% reduced) and average cost (25% reduced), compared to scenario 2, indicates that the myopic bidding strategy provides the optimal bid vector when only current benefits are considered as shown in Section III.E.
In scenario 5, SU 1 improves further the bidding strategy using the best response learning algorithm developed in Section IV. Using learning, SU 1 reduces the packet loss rate to 15.14% and the average cost to 1.7428 (11.8% lower compared to scenario 4). This significant improvement is due to the ability of the SU to learning and forecast the future impact of its current actions.
It is also worth to note that the reduction of the packet loss rate of SU 1 in scenarios 2~5 comes from two parts: one is the advanced bidding strategies, which allows the SU to take into consideration more information about its own states and the other SUs' states and, based on this, better forecast the impact of various actions, and the other one is the increase in the amount of resources consumed by SU 1 which corresponds to higher tax charged by the CSM, as shown in Table 2 . We further note that the bidding strategy deployed by SU 1 will affect the performance of SU 2. For example, comparing scenario 2 with scenario 4, the fixed bidding strategy of SU 1 in scenario 2 leads to a lower average cost (15% reduced) for SU 2. This is because SU 1 uses a fixed bidding strategy, which does not account for the dynamic changes in its environment, while SU 2 minimizes its current cost (the number of packets lost plus the tax) based on its current state. However, when comparing scenario 5 with scenario 4, SU 1 using learning not only improves its prediction of the current environment dynamics but also better predicts the impact on the future cost based on the observations. The improvement leads to higher resource allocation (hence, incurring higher tax, see in Table 2 ) for SU 1, thereby resulting in worse performance for SU 2 (i.e. the average cost is increased by 22.2%). Similar to the two-SU network, SU 5 significantly reduces the packet loss rate by 14.6% and average cost by 16.1% by adopting the best response learning-based bidding strategy. Figure 6 (a) and (b) further verify the improvement of the performance for SU 1. However, other SUs' performances are decreased, as they need now to compete against a learning SU (i.e. SU 5), which is able to make better bids for the available resources. 
B. Impact of various dynamics on learning
In Section V.A, we demonstrate that the best response learning algorithm improves the bidding strategy, thereby leading to a reduced packet loss rate and average cost. In this simulation, we further investigate how various dynamics impact the learning algorithm proposed in Section IV.D. Specifically, we compare the learning performance under different channel dynamics, i.e. various available spectrum opportunities for the SUs as discussed in Section III.B. The source characteristics and channel conditions experienced by the SUs are kept the same as in Section V.A(1). We consider three types of channel dynamics corresponding to scenarios 1~3. The transition probabilities of the channel availability for all three scenarios are listed in Table 4 . In each scenario, we compare two cases: in the first one, both SUs deploy myopic bidding strategies, and in the second one, SU 1 deploys best response learning-based bidding strategy, while SU 2 still uses the myopic bidding strategy. Table 5 shows the average packet loss rate and cost experienced by the SUs under various channel dynamics. Interestingly, we observe from these results that even though the learning algorithm reduces the packet loss rate, it does not reduce the cost associated with SU 1, when the channel resources are abundant as in scenario 1. As the resources become increasingly scarce, the learning algorithm helps SU 1 to simultaneously reduce the packet loss rate and cost, e.g. in scenario 2 and 3. This observation can be explained as follows: when the resources are abundant, the cost (including the packet loss and tax) is small, i.e. the "value" of the channel is limited, and hence, the learning-based bidding strategy does not significantly benefit. On the other hand, when the resources are scarce, the bid vectors of the SUs in the current time slot will significantly affect the transition of their states through the channel allocation comparing to the case when the resources are abundant. For example, if an SU makes low bids as compared to other SUs, it might have no resources (channels) allocated to it when resources are scarce (i.e. the cognitive radio network is congested). In this case, the learning-based bidding strategy will carefully plan the bid by considering the future impact and thus, it is able to successfully improve the performance of SU 1 in terms of reducing the average cost. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we model the cognitive radio resource allocation problem as a "stochastic game" played among strategic SUs. At each stage of the game, the CSM deploys a generalized second price auction mechanism to allocate the available spectrum resource. The SUs are allowed to simultaneously and independently make bid decision on that resource by considering their current states, experienced environment as well as the estimated future reward. To improve the bid decision at each stage, we propose a best response learning algorithm to predict the possible future reward at each state. The simulation results
show that our proposed learning algorithm can significantly improve the SUs' performance. Our future work will focus on analyzing the performance of cognitive radio networks where multiple SUs are deploying various learning strategies and protocols.
